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The Ratification of the EU Constitution: 
An Amer ican Perspective on Why it 
Failed 
Timothy S. Boylan 
Winthrop University 
To a teacher and researcher of American constitutional law and 
theOJJ'. an overall examination of the process of constitution-
making is an irresistible project. The project began with an arti-
cle published in this journal (Boylan 2005) on the framing of the 
European Union :S Constitutional Treaty. This study is the result 
of a year :S Sabbatical (2004-2005) spent in Europe. During 
that time. the author visited 21 of the 2 5 current EU member 
states. conduc ted numerous interviews with legal scholars, poli-
ticians and civic leader/ and both studied and taught in a Euro-
pean institution as a visiting Fulbright professor. All that follows 
is the result of reading. listening and then drawing comparisons 
as an American observe,'. 
The Convention on the Future of Europe provided a unique opportunity for academics and students of constitutional theory to survey three phases of constitution mak.ing-
enactment, ratification and enforcement-as they unfolded. As 
one writer observed, "Those who are witness to this historic 
process are extremely fortunate. In the United States, many 
watch with awe and envy as Europeans confront the opportunity 
to create the most sophisticated, up-to-date, enlightened constitu-
' Interviews were conducted with 35 individuals , including 12 political science profes-
sors, 6 law school professors, 4 think tank scholars, 2 business professionals , I religious 
leader, 3 educational administrators, 2 ambassadors, I retired United Nations official, I 
translator . and 3 professors from other disciplines . 
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tion of modern time" (Gormley 2003). 2 The scale, scope, ambi-
tion and significance of the European project created great inter-
est across a wide range of disciplines, from law to politics, from 
economics to public policy. Naturally, it also invited comparison 
and contrast with the American experience of 200 years earlier. 
The question posed here is, why did the EU fail to ratify its 
constitution? A working hypothesis is that the document failed 
for reasons only indirectly related to its substantive provisions. 
Rather, the sheer size and complexity of the document frustrated 
attempts to read, summarize or promote it. Further, both propo-
nents and detractors could mine the text in order to portray it in 
radically different terms. The very complexity of the constitutio n 
was a signal to some that its goal-an ever closer union-would 
be a 70,000-plus word Trojan horse that would allow Brussels to 
insinuate itself via further regulation, standardization, and ho-
mogenization in order to overwhelm the member states. The de-
bate over the constitution became a debate over the political 
economy of Europe. Highly symbolic and emotionally-charged 
issues-job security, national identity, Muslim immigration and 
assimilation, social welfare and pension benefits-animated de-
bate and discussion. Gurfinkiel concluded 
In theory, the referendum on Europe had nothing to do with 
domestic politics. In practice, as everyone understood, things 
were different. A strong no vote would be taken as a demand 
for deep changes at home, if not a species of popular revolt" 
(2005, 39). 
The process of ratification; with some members opting for 
referendum, some for parliamentary approval and some for a 
combination of each; became a contentious and confusing affair. 
' Although Gom1ley focuses attenlion on the period of the Articles of Confederation , he 
concludes that "the American experience does provide invaluable lessons when it comes 
to constructing a forward-thinking and enduring European Constitution ." at 101. 
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Meanwhile, the claim that the Convention had been hijacked by 
elites and that the draft constitution did not address the "democ-
ratic deficit" led some members, most notably France, to change 
direction and offer their citizens the chance to give direct ap-
proval through an up-or-down vote. In the end, the procedural 
requirement that ratification be unanimous magnified the impor-
tance of each member's choice. Each was, potentially, a veto of 
one. In late May of 2005, two founding members of the Euro-
pean Union, France and the Netherlands, voted the constitution 
down by sizable margins. While a number of member states have 
proceeded with ratification votes following the French and Dutch 
referenda (the significance of which will be discussed in the final 
section), the combined votes of these two pivotal member states 
"shelved" the constitution for the foreseeable future. 3 
Observers have been cautious about comparing and contrast-
ing the Convention on the Future of Europe with the Philadel-
phia Convention of some 200 years earlier. There are some who 
have utilized the language of comparison in speeches and schol-
arly works (de Burca 2004) only to minimize those possibilities 
in the text of their arguments. For instance, one scholar asked, 
(Are there] any real parallels with the adoption of the US 
Constitution in 1787 as a replacement for the Articles of 
Confederation, or do the great differences in historical con-
text and circumstance render such a comparison entirely in-
appropriate? According to a number of influential 
commentators, the two processes do not bear serious com-
parison (de Burca 2004, 583). 4 
' Immediately following the French and Dutch votes, Britain announced that it was sus-
pending indefinitely any consideration of the constitutional treaty . Within a short time, 
Denmark , Ireland , Poland, and the Czech Republic followed suit. 
' Note, however , that de Burca does draw out two clear parallels - the need for external 
security and the prevention of internal dissent - which form the thesis of her paper . She 
conclude s, "Nonetheless , taking the different circumstances of history and time into 
Nore continue s 
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Jurgen Habermas failed to find any parallels with either the con-
vention in Philadelphia or the French Revolutionaries at the As-
semblee Nationale in Paris at the close of the 19th Century 
(2001). Each of those earlier gatherings was "engaged in an ex-
traordinary undertaking, without historical precedent (pp. 5-6)" 
and addressed very different challenges. For Habermas, the mis-
sion of EU convention was "not to invent anything, but to con-
serve the great democratic achievements of the democratic 
nation state" (p. 6). 
Although Neil Walker would not disagree with Habennas' 
overall assessment, he would note that a constitution is often a 
cause of integration and not necessarily an outgrowth of it. If 
Europe lacked the social preconditions to mobilize the Euro pean 
citizenry around a new constitution, perhaps the framing and 
promotion of the document would help create those precondi-
tions. He cautions readers against an inflexible view of cause-
and-effect and concludes 
Of course, Constitutions cannot take root in entirely fallow 
ground. Yet it is often overlooked that Constitutions have his-
torically been agents of integration, rather than mere endorse-
ments of existing political communities, in just these 
circumstances where traditional sources of cultural or political 
identification are not readily available-think of eighteenth-
century America with its diverse immigrant communities, or 
twentieth-century Germany defeated and divided by war 
(2006, 13). 
Paul Magnette maps out three broad thematic areas that cau-
tion observers against drawing out comparisons with the Ameri-
can experience. He states 
account, it is clearly the case that much of the political energy directed towards the pro-
motion and justification of a constitution for the EU at the present time is focused on its 
relation to the external world, and in strengthening its perceived internal unity {p. 583). 
TlfEJOURNi\L OF POLITICAL SCll ·'.NCr-. 
Tl/£ RATIFICATION OF THE EU CONSTITUTION 131 
It was however naYve to think that the Convention could be 
· Europe's Philadelphia.' First because, before the Conven-
tion, the EU was already much stronger than the loose 
American confederation: it was a firm and largely accepted 
legal order based on federal principles; it comprised stable 
and permanent institutions, some directly elected by citizens; 
and was based on a intensely regulated single market and a 
common currency. Secondly, European states at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century, with their long history, 
strong national identities, large fiscal resources and redis-
tributive policies, cannot be compared to the young, weakly 
populated and recently independent 'states' which formed 
the American Confederation. Finally, nothing in the present 
European situation could create a pressure comparable to the 
context of military, commercial, political, moral and reli-
gious crisis that had given rise to the Philadelphia process 
(2003, 7). 
This study offers a different perspective. 5 While care should 
be taken to avoid spurious connections, the year bracketed by the 
accession of the ten new member states (May, 2004) and the 
French and Dutch referenda (May/June, 2005) demonstrated that 
valid, meaningful and intriguing parallels could be drawn be-
tween the success of the American constitutional process (in the 
framing, promotion and ratification of the draft document) and 
the failure of the European project. Further, a survey of the pro-
visions of the text, the process of ratification and the politics of 
the debates provides clear indications of how and why the Euro-
pean text was scuttled and may provide some direction for future 
efforts to revise, revive or reintroduce the constitutional treaty. 
' I am not dismissing the aforementioned scholars who warned against making direct 
comparisons. Each of these commentators wrote before the completion of the final draft 
document and the beginning of the ratification process. These writers cautioned about 
making comparisons tied to the motives of the framers. My intent here is to focus on the 
dynamics or ratification. 
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PROVISIONS AND POLITICS: 
A 70,000 WORD RORSCHACH TEST 6 
The European Union has grown and evolved over the last 
fifty years from a loose economic and trade confederation of six 
nations to the current union of twenty-five member states 
(Gurfinkiel 2005). Over the latter half of the 20th CenhITy, a 
cluster of treaties enabled the Union's members to trade more 
freely, adopt a single currency and agree on issues from immi-
gratio n to the environment. 7 These treaties have been cumulative, 
in that each built upon, but did not replace, the existing agree-
ments . Further , the founding treaties have been amended on sev-
eral occasions, usually coinciding with the addition of new 
member states. The draft EU constitution was a departure from 
these arrangements, as it aimed to replace all of the existing trea-
ties with a single, comprehensive text. 
Not until 2000 had there been a serious proposal to consider 
a constitution for Europe . Beginning with the proposal by Jo-
schka Fischer (Nelson and Stubb 2003, 70-75) ,8 the German for-
eign minister, the turn of the century witnessed a vigorous debate 
over the feasibility and desirability of a constitutional document. 
In the years that followed, a plan took shape for a Conven tion for 
the Future of Europe that would frame a draft document. For 
sixtee n months during 2002-2003, the convention drew over 200 
delegates from over twenty countries. These "framers'' sought to 
1
' The Rorschach test, commonly known at the " Ink Blot Test," is named after Swiss 
psychiatrist Hermann Rorschach . It functioned as a personality analysis test in which the 
person being tested was asked to identify what is su1;1gested to him by a series of ink blot 
designs of various shapes . 
7 It is beyond the scope of this study to survey the history and provisions of the existing 
Europea n Union treaties . Europa, the official website of the EU, provides an excellent 
treatment of the treaties (http ://europa .eu.int/abc/treaties/index_en.htm) . A more compre-
hensive history of the treaties can be found in Churc h, Clive 1-1. and David Phinnemore, 
2002. The Penguin Guide to 1/re European Union Treaties. London : Penguin Books, Llcl. 
• Speech given at Humboldt University in Berlin , May 12. 2000. 
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codify the treaties that had bound the nations of Europe together 
since the middle of the 20th Century and to both articulate and 
clarify the core principles that had brought about the call for a 
constitution. These principles, articulated by French President 
Jacques Chirac in a speech before the German Bundestag in 
2000, included the following: (I) making the European Union 
more democratic, as there was a common perception that the 
building of Europe had been, for the most part, the work of lead-
ers and elites; (2) clarifying the division of responsibilities 
among the different levels of the European system, while recog-
nizing the need to apply the principle of"subsidiarity;" 9 (3) guar-
anteeing that enlargement and progress would be mutually 
supportive; and (4) ensuring that Europe would have strong insti-
tutions and effective decision-making mechanisms where major-
ity voting was the rule and that majority voting would reflect the 
relative weights of the member states (Nelson and Stubb 2003, 
75-78). IO 
The final draft document covered these points and more. The 
70,000 word text had four major sections. Part I contained the 
institutional reforms that brought the succession of past treaties 
together. Part II, a constitution in itself, incorporated the prolix 
Charter of Fundamental Rights that had been adopted in 2000. 
Part III streamlined, simplified and re-stated already existing 
European Union treaty law. Part rv, similar to Articles V and VII 
of the US Constitution, contained the procedures for ratification 
and amendment. 
Scholars, politicians, journalists and observers soon devel-
oped conflicting descriptions. The disagreement over terminol-
., Subsidiarity is the doctrine that governance should take place at the lowest possible, or 
most sensible , level . President Chirac described it as the need to have answers provided at 
the level closest to the problems al hand. 
'" From the text of the speech by French President Jacques Chirac before the German 
Bundestag on June 27. 2000 . 
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ogy became confusion over identity . The key leaders of the Con-
vention found themselves juggling terminology from speech to 
speech. Valery Giscard d 'Estaing, President of the Convention, 
first suggested the use of the term "constitutional treaty." Many 
participants at the Convention, however, had opted for the more 
unequivocal language of "constitution." Others referred to the 
document as the "constitutional text." When the final text ap-
peared in July of 2003, it was named the "treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe." 11 
Some scholars have suggested that the Convenbon failed to 
produce a true constitution . The text, bringing together and 
meshing the provisions of the treaties that preceded it, could not 
be legally distinguished from its predecessors . But it was envi-
sioned, written and promoted as a constitution . And the use of 
that language created expectations, assumptions, fears and com-
plications that could not easily be answered or resolved by the 
proponents of the document. 
Misunderstanding emerged in two ways. First, the length and 
detail of the document meant that it was very difficult for citi-
zens, groups, and even leaders to have a comprehensive grasp on 
its contents. Not only was it difficult to fully apprehend, but it 
was also relatively easy to either misrepresent or selectively at-
tack. In a certain sense, it was a form of political Rorschach test 
that enabled groups across the political spectrum to justify their 
fears about the direction and scope of European enlargement, 
integration and unification . Richard Bellamy observed that "the 
drafters side-stepped their disagreements by choosing formula-
tions that were so abstract that all sides could read into them 
what they liked. Yet, this strategy merely postpones the day of 
11 See de Burca (2004, 560) for further description of how the language of the document 
reflected the complexity and ambiguity surrounding the process of enactment and the 
debate over ratification . 
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reckoning and assumes legitimate bodies exist to decide the 
question, which is doubtful (Bellamy, 2006)." In France, resis-
tance from the left focused on Part III, the existing body of EU 
law and policies that have developed since the 1950s. In essence, 
Part [Il contained little that was new or innovative. However, the 
French "Non" campaign was successfully able to describe that 
section of the Constitution as the high road to further globaliza-
tion and enlargement with the concurrent loss of French sover-
eignty and autonomy. 12 The left coalition's ability to link this 
section of the Constitution with the British free-market economic 
model-with the attendant fears for the future of the French so-
cial welfare system-advanced a frightening interpretation of the 
text. Thus, a section of the text that did little more than formal-
ize and streamline already existing arrangements was portrayed 
as a dangerous new development. One writer observed 
With Part Ill recapitulating 50 years of European integration, 
moreover, the referendum gave voters their first-ever oppor-
tunity to challenge formally and directly core features of the 
EU: its competition policy, the freedom-of-movement rules 
in the single market (notably the liberalization of services), 
the euro and the EU's monetary policy, and enlargement. 
The pre-referendum debates also reflected dissatisfaction 
with slow growth and high unemployment, immigration, 
enlargement and "social dumping" from new members, the 
prospect of Turkish membership, globalization, and the 
growing competition from China and the United States. 
They revealed profound worry about Europe's ability to ad-
dress these concerns, especially as a group of 25 heteroge-
neous members increasingly unable to act efficiently and 
"There was as much resistance from the right-wing parties in France as there was from 
the Jen. The right's J'ear or unbridled immigration and the resulting threat to job security, 
coupled wllh rears over Turkey joining the Union, helped bring about a coalition of the 
right and the Jen against ratification. 
\'OL. 35 2007 
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with no stable geographic or cultural borders in sight. Never 
mind that the constitutional treaty improved the institutional 
framework and decision-making process of the EU and did 
little else (Cohen-Tanugi 2005 , 57-58). 
No referenda were held in Eastern European countries and 
many of the national parliaments in those countries were quick to 
ratify the document without protests or resistance. Public opinion 
polls showed that citizens in Eastern European countries had less 
overall knowledge of the contents of the constitution, but were 
generally supportive of the document and saw it, on whole, as a 
positive development. 13 It simply reflected and confim1ed their 
newly acquired "belonging" to Europe and symbolized their 
freedom from an oppressive and heartbreaking past. Even in 
Spain, a vigorous yes campaign managed to only get a bare con-
stitutional minimum ( 42%) of voters to the polls, and exit polling 
revealed that most citizens were ratifying the positive perform-
ance of the Spanish economy in recent years. A poll commis-
sioned in mid-2003 by the Elcano Royal Institute, a Madrid-
based think tank, had found that only 1 % of Spaniards knew 
what the constitutional convention was meant to do. Eighteen 
months later, with no apparent turnabout in public awareness, 
Spanish voters ratified the new constitution. 
In the less benign contexts of the French and Dutch refer-
enda , the government-sponsored yes campaigns could not over-
come the perception that the constitution would lock in trends 
and developments with deeply negative consequences. Peter Hy-
larides' survey of the Dutch referendum noted 
" See findings from the first Eurobarometer survey on the proposed Constitution. At: 
http ://ec.europa.eu/p ublic_opinion/nash/n 159 _2en.pdf. See pp. f 6-28 on the specific 
questions covering the content of the Constitution and pp. 29-30 on the conclusions. Note 
the language indicating that, "The rate of correct answers is significantly less high in the 
new me,nber states." (p. 24). 
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The first opinion poll canied out in January on behalf of the 
government showed that only 30 per cent of the population 
was in favor of the constitution. More than 80 per cent of the 
electorate indicated that they had no idea what the constitu-
tion was about, whilst two-thirds thought the European con-
stitution would replace the Dutch constitution (2006, 89-90). 
The debates played on passions and fears, with little effort to 
delve into the structure and meaning of the text. In the end, 
"hardly any of the treaty's new substance was debated during the 
French and Dutch referendum campaigns. The absence of a well-
focused discussion only compounded the effect of the potent 
misrepresentation that smTounded the text from the beginning" 
(Cohen-Tanugi 2005, 56). 
The second misunderstanding was centered more on how the 
process took place than on the document itself. One of the core 
purposes for enacting a constitution was to address the concept 
of a "democratic deficit" that had emerged from the Danish re-
jection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. 14 There were high ex-
pectations that the process of constitution-making would bring in 
" The democratic deficit has also been termed a "legitimacy gap ." The gap has been 
defined as the popular perception rhat EU government lacks accountability and respon-
siveness. C'riucs contend that each successive treaty has pushed power away from democ-
rat1cally elected national governments and towards supra-national institutions and 
bureaucracies far removed from democratic accountability. 
The European Union continues to struggle with finding the proper balance between 
centralized and coordinated power in Brussels and national sovereignty within the mem-
ber states. During the ratification debates over the U.S. Constitution , great care was taken 
to ensure the states that their sovereignty would not be jeopardized . The Supremacy 
Clause was balanced by the enumerated powers reserved to the states in Article I, Section 
9, and by the later inclusion of the Tenth Amendment. The text of the American Constitu-
tion clearly marked out the scope and limits of the new government's power in a way that 
the EU Constitution's treatment or "subsidiarity" did not. For a further discussion com-
paring the two documents, see my earlier essay in this Journal. Vol. 33 2005. pp. 1- 38. 
For an inforn1ative roundtable on the question of democratic legitimacy in the wake of 
the no votes. see Moravcsik. Andrew . 2005. "Europe Without Illusions ." Prospect. Issue 
112. July. pp. 22-26 . 
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diverse voices from across the political, cultural and geographi-
cal spectrum, and would symbolize a new phase of democratic 
openness within the EU . Jo Shaw noted 
Since its creation was first announced in December of 200 I 
at the Laeken European Council meeting, very substantial 
expectations have been invested in the Convention on the 
Future of the Union by many observers of the European in-
tegration process. Perhaps it could finally address the yawn-
ing legitimacy gap that appears to have opened up in 
European public affairs since the time of the Treaty of Maas-
tricht, leading to a widespread alienation between the activi-
ties of the European institutions and those whom they are 
meant-like any public bodies-to serve, that is, the citizens 
and residents of the member states (2003). 
Leaders hoped that the inclusiveness of the Convention and an 
array of communications strategies (the Convention had its own 
dedicated website with daily updates) would begin to address the 
question of democratic legitimacy . For the vast majority of 
Europeans, they didn't. It was then hoped that the ratification 
process would create public dialogue and cause individual citi-
zens and interest groups to delve into the specific provisions of 
the document. By early 2005 and the opening salvos of the 
French and Dutch battles for their respective referendum votes, 
there was concern that the democratic process would yield an 
ironic result: the very democratic process that the framers hoped 
to bring about through the creation of the constitution would oc-
casion its downfall. 15 In his May 2000 speech at Humboldt Uni-
,., A number of scholars have noted the irony that the democratic process. through the 
referendum , would be the agent whereby the Constitution would fall. For Whitman, "It is 
ironic that the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe should have been called into 
question by the citizens of the EU member states . as one of the original purposes envis-
aged for the treaty was to bring the EU and its institutions closer to those citizens ." See 
Note continues 
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versity calling for a constitution, Gennany's foreign minister, 
Joschka Fisher, warned 
[T]his process of European integration that is now being 
called into question by many people; it is viewed as a bu-
reaucratic affair run by a faceless, soulless Eurocracy in 
Brussels-at best boring, at worst dangerous ... 
Europe is not a new continent, so the criticism goes, but full 
of different peoples, cultures, languages and histories. The 
nation-states are realities that cannot simply be erased, and 
the more globalization and Europeanization create super-
structures and anonymous actors remote from their citizens, 
the more the people will cling on to the nation-states that 
give them comfort and security ... 
That is why it would be an irreparable mistake in the con-
struction of Europe if one were to try to complete political 
integration against the existing national institutions and tra-
ditions rather than by involving them. Any such endeavor 
would be doomed to failure by the historical and cultural en-
vironment in Europe (Nelsen and Stubb 2003, 70-75). 
Despite an extended and intensive effort, the proponents of 
the new constitution could not overcome the perception that the 
draft text threatened "existing national institutions and traditions 
rather than by involving them." In both France and the Nether-
lands, the fear of losing sovereignty and autonomy made the cost 
of ratification high and the cost of rejection low. In each country, 
the threats to existing benefits and arrangements were clear, 
while the potential benefits to further integration were not. 
Fisher's warning proved to be a prescient one. 
Whitman, Richard. "No and After: Options for Europe ." !11ternntio11al Affairs . Vol. 81. 
o. 4. p. 673 . 
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These issues of size , complexity and accessibility stand in 
stark contrast to the American experience. The Philadelphia 
Convention produced a spare, 7000-word text that contained 
both enumeration and detail (as seen in the Article I, Section 8 
powers granted to Congress) and ambiguity (as seen in the power 
and role of the judicial branch described in Article III) . For the 
most part , it was a structuring document that sought to remedy 
the shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation and be accept-
able to the cluster of audiences awaiting it in the state ratifying 
conventions. Rather than touch off debate about what the docu-
ment said , the months following the close of the Philadelphia 
Convention focused on what tbe text meant. There was no need 
to wallow through 200-plus pages of complex , and sometimes 
conflicting verbiage , wondering how the various guarantees and 
provisions would mesh . While many other factors come into play 
when comparing the American and European ratification proc-
esses , the size and complexity of the European text and the im-
plications of those factors cannot be ignored . As one 
commentator quipped , "The U.S. Constitution of 1787 is short, 
lucid , reassuringly specific and yet usefully vague" (Garfinkiel 
2005 , 45) . In comparison , the American experience largely 
lacked the "Rorschach test" quality that was so clearly seen in 
the Spanish , French and Dutch referenda. In America , the debate 
focused on the text , and not on what various audiences and 
groups "saw" hovering over the text. As Bernard Bailyn de-
scribes , 
The initial publication of the Constitution on September 17, 
1787, and Congress ' s call for the states to vote on ratifica-
tion touched off one of the most extensive public debates on 
constitutionalism and on political principles ever recorded . 
The entire political nation was galvani zed in the debate. Lit-
erally thousands of people , in this nation of appro ximately 
one million eligible voters, participated in one way or an-
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other. There were some fifteen hundred official delegates to 
the twelve state ratifying conventions, where every section, 
every clause, and every phrase of the Constitution was raked 
over. There was a multitude of newspaper commentaries, 
sermons, letters, broadsides and personal debates on the 
Constitution; they turned up in even the most remote comers 
of the nation (2003, I 07). 
Despite the claim that "the text of the Constitution for 
Europe is to a far greater extent the result of codification and 
consolidation of existing EU and EC law principles than of insti-
tutional change" (Ziller 2005, 251 ), the ratification process in 
Europe saw the constitution more as symbol than as substance. 
How else can the French vote be explained? Opponents to the 
text from opposite ends of the ideological spectrum could unite, 
play upon the public's Jack of knowledge about the text, and shift 
the focus of debate. Cohen-Tanugi explains, 
A clever, ad hoc opposition-to the treaty, European inte-
gration, EU enla~gement, the market economy, globaliza-
tion, and some national governments-took advantage of the 
public's mixed feelings about Europe by obscuring the basic 
fact that the constitutional convention's rational and well-
mtentioned central objective had been to address some of the 
EU's shortcomings and distill its main tenets into a single 
comprehensive and streamlined document (2005, 57). 
In the end, the EU constitution failed in large part because its 
provisions were seen abstractly and symbolically rather than 
concretely and substantively. For the newly acceded nations of 
Eastern Europe, the document represented freedom, democracy 
and economic opportunity. For the Spaniards, it was symbolic of 
the significant economic gains that the country has made over 
the past fifteen years . But for the core founding countries-
France and the Netherlands-it was seen (by a definitive major-
ity of voters) as a departure from, and a threat to, the social con-
\'OL. 35 2007 
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tract, economic security and national autonomy of each. Substan-
tive debate , such as what was witnessed across the American 
states in the 1780s , was undermined and outwitted by a deter-
mined opposition . One of the EU's most cogent observers con-
ceded 
One is forced to conclude that the constitution became con-
troversial not because its content was objectionable, but be-
cause the content was so innocuous that citizens saw a 
chance to cast an inexpensive protest vote ... So it was not 
the substance of the emerging constitutional settlement that 
triggered opposition. The objectionable aspect was its form: 
an idealistic constitution (Moravcsik 2005, 56-57). 
Any future attempts to reconsider the European constitution will 
have to confront the size , scope and complexity of the original 
draft , and perhaps take into account the history and dynamics of 
the American ratification process. A shorter , more concise docu-
ment may allow readers to comprehensively grasp its contents 
and to better focus on its substantive provisions. 
PROCESS AND POLITICS: WHEN? HOW? HOW MANY? 
In looking for reasons why the Constitution of the Europe 
failed , attention must be turned to the procedural choices made 
by the architects of the document. Care must be taken when 
making comparisons and drawing contrasts with the American 
experience - here more than in other sections. Paul Magnette's 
warning needs to be revisited and respected (2003) . However, a 
distinction can be made between differences which prevent 
meaningful comparisons and those that provide and invite the 
same. 
The Strategy of Sequence. The proponents of the new con-
stitution hoped to build momentum by securing a number of en-
thusiastic "yes" votes at the beginning . The parliaments of 
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Lithuania and Hungary voted in late 2004 and approved the con-
stitution (as did every parliamentary vote) by wide margins. 16 
Slovenia's parliament followed in early February. The Spanish 
referendum was in late February . The Spanish vote became a 
matter of some speculation, not because the direction of the vote 
was in doubt, but because Spanish law mandated that a referen-
dum would only be binding if 40% of the eligible electorate 
voted. A public relations blitz, which included high-profile visits 
from the French and German heads of state and the endorse-
ments of a host of public figures and celebrities, garnered just 
enough interest and response by voting day. A slight percentage 
above the mandated minimum, 42%, came out to vote and 77% 
of those voted in favor of the constitution. After the Spanish ref-
erendum, the parliaments of Italy, Greece , Slovakia and Austria 
ratified the document by wide to near-unanimous margins. By 
the end of May, eight nations had ratified the constitution with 
the lowest parliamentary majority approving by 81 %. 17 The hope 
was that the momentum of the earlier votes would influence the 
closer and, in some instances, more strategically important, ref-
erenda. 
Emboldened by the outcome in Spain, the Dutch govern-
ment fixed its own referendum for June I 51, and France moved its 
vote forward from June to May. Each hoped to benefit from the 
1
'' The Lithuanian parliament voled 84-4 to ratify the constitution. The Hungarian parlia-
ment's vote was 304-9. A website for tracking ratification is sponsored by the BBC. For a 
rundown on each country's ·status, see "EU Constitution: Where member states stand" at 
h I tp ://news vote. b be. co. u k/mpapps/pagetoo Is/print/news. bbc.co. uk/ I /h i/world/europe/3 9 5 
4327.stm. 
17 II should be noted that the German Bu11desm1 surprised most observers by voting to 
ratify the constitution on May 27, 2005, just 48 hours before the French referendum. The 
81111deswg had voted its approval on May 12. This was widely seen as an effort to give 
ihc French a symbol of solidarity and provide one final motivational push. llowever , the 
German bill to ratify has never been signed by President llorsl Koehler, and Germany 
remarns in the "nearly rat,lied" category. 
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added to the momentum provided by the earlier parliamentary 
votes. Might more yes votes and more momentum changed the 
outcome in France and/or the Nether lands? The final section of 
this paper notes that, as of January 2007, seven countries have 
ratified the constitution since the French and Dutch votes . Per-
haps more pressure could have been brought to bear on the Ger-
man and Belgian governments to sign off on the approval from 
their parliaments . Add those seven yes votes to the mix , and a 
majority of the member states would have given approval to the 
text. What can now be seen as a tactical decision on the part of 
France and the Netherlands - hurrying to take advantage of the 
Spanish yes vote-may have been the right idea at the wrong 
time. However , leaders from each country saw an erosion of 
support for ratification - a trend moving counter to the accumu-
lation of more yes votes from other member states . The "front-
loading" of members strongly in favor of the constitution 
paralleled that of the early ratification debates in America . The 
outcome did not. 
Big States, Small States. What is also true of both processes 
is that , while all ratifying votes were important, some were es-
sential. In the American instance, certain states had to ratify if 
the new constitution (and the new nation that it constituted) was 
to succeed. Virginia, Pennsylvania , Massachusetts and New York 
were the bell weather states. The first three states held 45% of 
the free population. New York was of signal geographical impor-
tance- its territory could split the union into two, non-
contiguous sections. If one or more of these states voted down 
the constitution, the future of "a more perfect union" envisioned 
in the Preamble was in serious doubt. 
Likewise, the votes in France , Germany , Italy and the United 
Kingdom were equally necessary. An impressive 57% of the 
population and 66% of the economic productivity came from 
these four nations . The Italian and German votes were handled in 
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accumulation of yes votes and to ride Spain's momentum. Public 
opinion polls indicated that the Dutch were growing steadi ly 
more disenchanted over immigration and with the country's 
status as the largest net per capita contributor to the EU budget. 
In France, polls showed that the yes votes had fallen from 69% 
to 61 % in the first three months of 2005 (Crumley 2005). "The 
Dutch wanted to set an early referendum date before resentment 
grows too high," explained Dominique Reynie, a European af-
fairs expert at Paris' Foundation of Political Science. 'T he 
French want to hold theirs first because the risk of a no vote in 
the Netherlands is greater and the probable yes vote in France 
will increase pressure on the Dutch not to drop the ball. They 
hope each successive passage will make it harder for voters to 
break ranks and reject the text" (in Cmmley 2005, 40). 
There is an intriguing parallel here with the state ratifying 
conventions that debated and voted on the US Constitution. The 
first five state conventions' votes were quickly taken and over-
whelming positive, with three conventions voting unanimous ly 
to ratify. Between December 7, 1787 and January 8, 1788, Dela-
ware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia and Connecticut 
placed themselves in the "yes" column. But these were the easy 
votes. With only one exception, Maryland, all of the succeeding 
ratification votes would be closely contested and the winning 
margins would be considerably smaller. 18 
While hindsight always provides a degree of clarity and con-
fidence, it can be said that the proponents of the new constitution 
had the correct strategy but may have failed to get the timing 
right. The Spanish referendum was a confidence builder, and it 
" It should also be noted that North Carolina, the 12th state to vote, rejected ratification 
by a wide margin ( 184-84). It would take another fifteen months before North Carolina's 
convention would reconvene , reconsider their position , and vote to ratify . A chart show-
ing the state convention votes can be seen in Farber , Daniel A. and Suzanna Sherry . 
1990. A History of the Americn11 Co11s1i1utio11. St. Paul: West Publishing . p. 216 . 
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the respective parliaments. The French and British governments 
resisted, but eventually gave into, popular approval via the refer-
endum. While such can only be surmised, a no vote from Ma lta 
and Slovenia would not have the impact of a no from France or 
Germany. Despite the unanimous vote requirement (discussed 
below), all votes are not created equal. A single no from a new ly 
acceded Eastern state against 24 yes votes would likely have oc-
casioned a re-vote or the possibility of exclusion from the rest of 
the EU going forward under the new constitution. But the no 
votes in two of the six founding nations of the EU, and the wide 
margin by which they prevailed, could not be countered, dis-
missed or interpreted away. 
E Pluribus Unum? The most telling factor in Europe's rati-
fication process was the requirement that all member states say 
yes. As the Convention on the Future of Europe began to con-
sider the possibility that the constitutional treaty would replace, 
rather than be incorporated into the existing legal framework, 
questions arose concerning the risk to the continuity of the ac-
quis communautaire. 19 Along with this issue arose the question 
of how the new constitutional treaty would be ratified and en-
forced. One scholar observing the Convention in late 2002 re-
ported that, 
This discussion focused on the possibility that the Con-
stitutional Treaty might enter into force while it has not 
been ratified by every Member State. In a working docu-
ment outlining a draft Constitution of the European Un-
ion, the European Commission underlined that under 
current Treaty rules, one Member State Could block the 
entry into force of the new Constitutional Treaty. To 
"' The entire body of European laws is known as the acquis co1111111111a111nire. This in-
cludes all the treaties , regulations and directives passed by the European institutions as 
well as judgments laid down by the Court of Justice. The tenn is most often used in con-
nection with preparations by candidate countries to join the union. 
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avoid such a situation , the Commission working docu-
ment proposed that Member States failing to ratify the 
Constitutional Treaty would be deemed to withdraw 
from the Union. While Convention President Giscard 
had spoken in a similar vein , the proposal was immedi-
ately rejected by the representative of the UK govern-
ment , who argued that Member States could not be held 
' at gunpoint ' like that (Devuyst 2003 , 36) . 
The Convention considered , but rejected , changes to the 
standing rules. This meant that the locus of power remained with 
the individual member state and not with the European Union as 
a collective whole . Each country was a veto of one, at least on 
paper. This brought about a difficult arrangement. The final draft 
document contained so many protections , regulations and provi-
sions that there was something for virtually everyone to oppose . 
And, the unanimous vote requirement caused many observers to 
doubt that the document could pass unscathed through 25 sepa-
rate votes . From legal scholars who insisted that the constitution 
must be ratified to those who did not think that failure would 
bring about a crisis , most expressed some doubt or reservation 
about the chance for success . Why? The unanimity requirement. 
Carlos Closa concluded, "In a 12 or 15 member community , 
unanimity (costly as it was) allowed the accommodation of even 
antagonistic visions through strenuous efforts . With 25 members, 
unanimity seems a recipe for disintegration" (Closa 2005 , 5). 
Consider the American ratification process in the late l 780s. 
The US Constitution called for a supennajority (67% or 9/ 13) of 
the states to ratify the document before it became the new charter 
of government. The Americans had faced the same dilemma as 
the EU Convention did in late 2002 . Under the Articles of Con-
federation , amendments required a unanimous vote . During the 
time that the Articles were in force , no amendments came close 
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to passing . Boylan 's earlier prior study of the US and EU consti-
tutional framing concluded, 
The framers of the [US) Constitution looked back on [the 
Articles'] shortcomings as they developed the procedures 
for ratifying the document... This framework still re-
quired a substantial amount of agreement on the part of 
the states, but eliminated the threat of an absolute veto 
from any individual state. As a result, each state ratifying 
convention had to face the possibility that it could reject 
the new government and that it would still be brought 
into being by the other states. The ability to veto and 
thwart the process was replaced by the potential to reject 
and be left as an outcast. While many of the state debates 
were heated and the final tally close, the whole process 
took less than one year and the overall vote was, eventu-
ally, unanimous. Much of this success can be linked to 
the rules set for ratification (2005, 30). 
How might the EU process have changed with a supermajority 
requirement for ratification? France could have still played the 
role of spoiler, and a crisis would have ensued as the EU could 
not effectively operate without France. But it can be sunnised 
that the other nations would have continued the process , to de-
termine if whatever supermajority requirement agreed upon was, 
in fact, met. 
This brings up an interesting "w hat if." What if the EU con-
stitution mandated a supermajority requirement for ratification -
say, 21 of 25 yes votes were needed to bring the document into 
force. What if the French and Dutch votes were followed by a 
rejection from the Czech Republic, but all other members voted 
to ratify. What then? The "glass half empty" view would wonder 
if the EU could continue to further integrate without the three 
rejecting countries. However , the "glass half full" camp could 
counter with the question of whether those three could, or would 
want to, make it alone without the European Union. Rules de-
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terrnine outcomes (witness, for example the institution of the 
Electoral College in the United States and the outcome of the 
2000 presidential elections) and procedu ral choices confer 
power. The unanimity requirement enabled French and Dutch 
votes to stop ratification in its tracks. A supermajority require-
ment could have allowed the process to finish, and may have left 
the rejecting members with a strong motivation to reconsider and 
to ratify. 
Without a unanimity requirement, the rejecting countries 
would have to confront the rather potent symbolism of being left 
behind by 22 member states under a new constitution. There is a 
vast difference between a unanimity requirement that allows lone 
dissenters to retain the present arrangement and a supermajority 
requirement that effectively votes lone dissenters out of member-
ship. In the early history of the new American republic, North 
Carolina and Rhode Island were left to consider the implications 
of going it alone after the 11 other states voted to ratify. In that 
case , the survival of a new nation was at stake. Today, the power, 
prestige and influence of Europe in an increasingly globalized 
and competitive world system arguably hinges upon its ability to 
further integrate . Thus, any reconsideration of an EU constitu-
tion- in whatever form it takes-will have to confront the im-
plications of procedure, and seriously consider revising the rules 
away from the "veto of one" format for ratification . 
PROSPECTS AND POSSIBl LIT I ES: W HAT NEE DS TO CHANGE 
Though the word "failed" figures prominently in the title of 
this essay , it is a bit misleading. As of this writing, the constitu-
tional treaty is in limbo, as the European Union announced, and 
then extended, a "period of reflection." After the French and 
Dutch no votes, European leaders were faced with two conflict-
ing trends. The "Euroskeptics" hailed the rejection of the docu-
ment and claimed to have the power, influenct: and momentum 
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to make permanent its defeat. Yet, other governments, most no-
tably Luxembourg, were distressed at the sudden call to cu11ail 
further ratifying votes. In response, the European Counci l sought 
a fonn of procedural compromise. As one observer noted, 
Faced with these conflicting tendencies, the European 
Council took not one decision but two: in effect, both to 
continue with the ratification process despite the two re-
jections (but without the original deadline of October 
2006) and, at the same time, to engage in a year's reflec-
tion, with no specified purpose, about the future of 
Europe. Commentators, both in the media and in the 
European Parliament, were unsympathetic. Nobody 
could satisfactorily explain how it is possible to simulta-
neously both to ratify and to reflect (Duff 2005, 4). 
In June 2005, parliaments in Latvia, Cyprus and Malta ratified 
the document as scheduled. Luxembourg hdd a referendum in 
mid-July. The parliaments of Belgium and Germany have al-
ready voted to ratify and final disposition awaits final signatures 
and formalities. Estonia and Finland ratified the document in 
mid-2006. Seven countries have put ratification voting on in-
definite hold. 
A number of commentators have observed that there is sig-
nificance to the post-France/Netherlands votes, as a majority of 
the member states have now approved the document. The fact 
remains, however, that many of the seven holdout members are 
likely no votes. This makes it unlikely that a meaningful super-
majority of yes votes will be obtained in the next year or so. A 
key provision in the constitution itself calls for a meeting of EU 
leaders in the event that four-fifths of the member states have 
ratified and the other members have not within two years of its 
Tl I Ii JOURN ,\I. OF POLITIC ,\!. SCll •:NCI• : 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE EU CONSTITUTION 151 
signature. 20 Given the fact that most of the prominent EU leaders 
want little to no change in the constitutional text, they consider 
this threshold to be important. For them, reaching 20 ratification 
votes will mean that a supermajority will have ratified the text in 
its present form. Opponents of the Constitution have been critical 
of using this provision to try to revive what is, in their eyes, a 
dead letter. 
A working conclusion is that the current constitutional text 
cannot and will not be ratified by all ( or nearly all) of the current 
EU member states even after the extended period of reflection 
has passed. As a consequence of this, some revision of the text, 
the procedures for ratification or both need to be considered. The 
author is very aware that these suggestions for change would 
have been considered far-fetched at best before the season of 
ratification began. At this point, it is impossible to predict which , 
if any, of these options will receive serious consideration. Yet, 
two uncomfortable and unavoidable facts remain. First, the prob-
lems and challenges that brought about the Convention on the 
Future of Europe have not disappeared. The economic challenges 
of globalization, the questions surrounding enlargement and the 
ongoing need for more effective and streamlined decision mak-
'" The original deadline J'or ratification was ovember, 2006. Since four-fifths of the 
member states had not ratified at that point, the period of reflection (and, by implication, 
the deadline) was extended. Declaration JO to the Constitutional Treaty provides that the 
European Council can consider what next steps may be taken with the constitution al 
treaty if the 4/5 mark is reached. However, it also built into the text (Article IV-445.2) 
that unanimous agreement would still be needed for any change to the text, which would 
place serious limits on the Council's ability to propose alternatives. See, in this regard, 
Kurpas. Sebastian and Justus Schonlau. 2006. "Deadlock Avoided, But Sense of Mission 
Lost? The Enlarged EU and its Uncertain Constitution." CEPS Policy Brief Centre for 
European Policy Studies. No. 92. February. pp. 1-9. 
Carlos Closa has asserted that Declaration JO implicitly commits national govern-
ments to take some action- referendum. parliamentary vote, or both-in order to verify 
whether 20 or more members will ratify the Constitution. and then take appropriate ac-
tion. C'losa. p. 2. 
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ing all need to be addressed. Second, two core member states 
have rejected the constitution by substantial margins. The lesson 
gained from Ireland after its rejection of the Nice treaty in 1992 
simply will not do here. In Ireland's case, a short pause, a minor 
reworking of the text and a re-vote worked for a small single 
rejection. 21 However, few, if any, observers see this pattern as 
applicable to France and the Netherlands. So, in short, something 
needs to happen, but not a recycling of the current text. 22 To ac-
commodate realities, the author offers the following possibilities: 
( l) Form a Council on Revision to shorten, streamline and 
simplify the document. This is not a proposal to drastically 
change the substance of the constitution. Rather, an effort to 
simplify the text would be a necessary first step toward making 
its provisions more accessible and more understandable to the 
European citizenry. I am cautioned by the scene in the film 
Amadeus, where Emperor Joseph II, the superficial and self-
absorbed ruler who could not tell the difference between a great 
opera and a mediocre one, complained that Mozart's music had 
"too many notes." At the risk of voicing a complaint of "too 
many words" with little sound constitutional theory to back the 
" Whitman surveys the key reasons why responses to past referendum no votes do not 
offer guidance for the present situation . lie points to the importance of the French and 
Dutch positions as founding members of the EU. the high turnouts for the vote (nearly 
double that of the Irish turnout for the Treaty or Nice referendum), and the dit'ficulty in 
determining which specific parts of the Constitution occasioned the no votes . For a more 
detailed treatment, see Whitman , pp. 681-682 . 
" Of all the proposals following the French and Dutch vote, most agree thal the text 
cannot be resubmitted to voters in France and the Netherlands (following a "cooling arr· 
period of an appropriate length) so that they can "get it right" on the second go-round . 
Nor can either country entertain a procedural change whereby popular consent is by-
passed in favor of a safer , more predictable, parliamentary vote . According to one 
scholar, "To suggest that the genie of public opinion can be put back into the boule, and 
replaced once again by eli1e-led, low-key, technocratic management of EU affairs is not 
only politically unrealistic but also democratically disdainful" (de Burca 2006, 7). 
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claim, evidence from the ratification debates indicate needed 
pruning and tightening. 
A shorter, more coherent document is a document that can be 
understood by its readers and critics. And this appears to be a 
key element to securing approval. As the ratification process be-
gan in late 2004, it was reported that polling across Europe had 
shown that there was a widespread lack of knowledge about and 
interest in the constitution. 23 In one study, "a mere 11 % of re-
spondents said they knew what the constitution contains; 56% 
said they knew little; and 33% said they had never even heard of 
it." The poll went on to discover that "[t]he sort of people who 
take the time to familiarize themselves with the document are 
also the sort who support it-75% of the respondents who knew 
its contents said they would vote for it. Only 22% of those who 
have never heard of it are in favor" (Crumley 2005, 40). 
If debate is to move from symbol to substance, the text will 
need to be made more accessible and more cohesive. Most 
scholars admit that the document could be shortened. It is hard to 
deny the claim made on a campaign poster for French right-wing 
politician Phillippe de Villiers that, with a text of 448 articles, 
"we all have a reason to say no" (in Dehousse 2006, 160). The 
question is how and where such shortening occurs. 
(2) Mandate a uniform ratification mechanism for all mem-
ber states that would reflect popular will and address the "legiti-
macy gap." Ratifying conventions, anyone? Perhaps the 
European Union can tear a page out from the American hand-
book and write a more specific ratifying procedure into the 
document that would dictate a particular format. Further, let that 
fom1at draw from the strengths of both parliamentary debate and 
" Sec Eurobarometer lindings from the November , 2004 lield study at: 
http://ec .europa.eu/publ ic _opinion /arch ives/ebs/ebs2 I 4_ en _Ii rst. pd f. A !so, see conclu-
sions from June. 2004 Eurobarometcr poll, p. 41, note 13. 
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popular discourse. Ratifying conventions similar to the ones held 
by the nascent American states could provide an intriguing and 
innovative alternative to the mish-mash of referenda, parliamen-
tary votes and combination of the two exercised by the EU 
member states last year (Warleigh 2003). 24 The composition of 
the participants would reflect representation across the cultura l, 
political and social spectrum and would address the ongoi ng 
complaint that the framing of the constitution was dominated by 
bureaucrats and elites . This would have to be a major compro-
mise hammered out by the revision committee suggested above. 
It would supersede constitutional mandates in a number of coun-
tries, which could lead to some political conflicts and constit u-
tional challenges. 25 But, as a one-time event, it could rekind le 
interest and focus attention on the core questions and challenges 
that face the European Union at this pivotal time in its existence. 
Andrew Duff, a member of the European Parliament, identifies 
the connection between a shorter, more streamlined constitution 
and the process of beginning a fresh round of ratification votes. 
One problem will be to persuade the countries that have 
already ratified the existing constitution to go through 
the process all over again with an amended text. The new 
" Alex Warleigh has suggested reconvening a constitutional convention that would draft 
two potential constitutions . One would be an mtergovemmental model , with a greater 
focus on the sovereign powers of the member states . I Jere, each member would hold 
considerable power to both formulate and limit EU policies . The other model would be a 
unitary one . in which EU leaders would be chosen directly from the overall European 
electorate . The two draft documents would then be subject to pan-European referenda . II" 
one model was favored by a clear majority , member states that had voted for the other 
model would hold a second vote to detem1ine whether to stay in the EU. See details of 
Warle1gh 's plan m Glenn , David . 2005 . "Making the C'ase for a United States of Europe ." 
Chronicle of Higher £d11cmio11. Vol. 51. Issue 44 . pp. A 12-A 14. 
" Germany , for example, mandates a parliamentary vote for the approval of treaties . This 
kept the Gcmian prime minister from having to confront the possibility of a referendum 
in 2005 , as the leaders of France and Great Britain chose to. Constitutional provisions 
such as these would complicate the call for a separate ratifying convention . 
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version will clearly have to be much more attractive to 
the general public if governments are to dare to seek a 
second round of ratification and campaign hard for it. 
But that in itself is an argument for making the new ver-
sion more obviously responsive to public criticism and to 
the real needs for better policies and decision-making 
procedures in Brussels (Duff2005). 
Evaluations of why the ratification failed can be placed in 
two broad and conflicting camps. One sees the defeat as a seri-
ous setback that was occasioned by ignorance. Voters rejected a 
move towards integration that was clearly in their best interests. 
For supporters of the constitution, the season ofreflection should 
be used to educate the citizens in the direction of reconsideration 
and ratification. The second camp sees the ratification failure as 
"a chance to review the model of European integration, to wel-
come the fact that at least some of the people of Europe have 
finally had a say in the matter and to take their views into ac-
count in deciding where to go next" (Dale 2005, 4). This camp 
would see the needed process of education pointed at leaders , not 
citizens-addressing the democratic deficit by listening to what 
the citizenry actually favors and opposes. 
The ratifying convention format coupled with a more acces-
sible constitutional text could potentially carve out a middle 
ground between these two conflicting perspectives. 
(3) Substitute a supermajority for the unanimous vote re-
quirement. This is the easiest and perhaps most effective adapta-
tion that can be made, though it would be subject to similar 
complications as surveyed above (Closa 2005) .26 Again, a 
~•· Closa asse11s that a "mi ni-Intergovernmental Conference" could refom, A11icle 48 of 
the Treaty of European Union and remove the unanimity requirement. At the same time, 
Anicle 477 of the Constitution (stipulating a unanimous vote for its entering into force) 
would have to be removed . Unf'onunately, "the resulting Conslllution would technically 
be a new one. (and) it would require a new round of ratification"(Closa 2005, 3). 
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change in the rules can have an impact upon the outcome. The 
diversity of opinion among the current EU members virtually 
ensures that some major constitutional provision will alienate 
some member states. One assessment concluded that 
Different counties have problems with different aspects 
of the text. While many people in France object to the 
treaty because it does not go far enough toward a harmo-
nized European social policy, the British and the Poles 
are against any further social policy integration. The 
French find serious fault with the treaty's failure to abol-
ish the national veto on tax policy, whereas any reference 
to taxation in the constitution is anathema to the UK and 
Ireland (Spinant 2005, 4). 
Earlier, member states, especially Britain, strenuously argued 
against changing unanimous ratification. The outcome of the 
French and Dutch votes may have softened this stance. 
As of this writing, the treaty arrangement has not caused 
enough complications or discomfort to push some member states 
to change their stance on the unanimous vote requirement. 27 It 
may take some further economic problems, a keener perception 
of Europe's eroding power base in global affairs, a security cri-
sis, or an emerging post-constitutional dialogue that looks to this 
procedural requirement to answer "what went wrong." In what-
ever way it does happen, it is almost mandatory that this re-
quirement changes before any reconsideration of the 
constitution-in any form- has a chance at success. 
07 This is not to say that there are no calls for reform. In February 2006, British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair said, "I accept we will need to return to the issues around the Euro-
pean Constitullon. A European Union of 25 cannot function properly with today's rules 
of governance. Having spent 6 months as EU President, I am a good willless lo that (in 
Baldwin 2006, 14)."Ba ldwin concludes that a "tipping point" will be reached in the near 
future and a broad consensus will emerge that institutional reform is imperative (p. 14). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The assessment of the ratification of the EU constitution and 
the suggestions for the future are pointedly and unavoidably 
American in perspective. It may come too close to the line where 
comparative method lapses into constitutional chauvinism. It 
could be charged that someone who spent a full year visiting in 
most every EU country should be able to do better than simply 
graft the American experience of centuries past onto to European 
experiment. The author is not aware of these problems when 
comparing the two ventures in constitution-making. 
And yet, somewhere along the way, the EU constitution 
failed. It was not scripted to do so. The motives were good, the 
time and effort expended over 16 months was extraordinary and 
the finished product did what it was intended to do. But other 
choices, dealing with the size and scope of the text and the pro-
cedures for its ratification, scuttled the project. If this is a project 
worth reviving and a goal worth achieving, some changes and 
adaptations will need to be made. The square peg of the EU text 
does not need to be jammed into the round ho le of the American 
experience. However, guidance may be gained from looking at 
an American Constitution's framing, ratification and endurance 
as a viable and workable charter of government. A balance can 
be found between using the American model as a blueprint and 
ignoring it completely. This study identifies selected areas that 
may inform and assist future efforts to secure a Constitution for 
the European Union. 
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